Boston University School of Law

Scholarly Commons at Boston University School of Law
Faculty Scholarship
2003

Vertical Restraints and Intellectual Property Law: Beyond Antitrust
Michael J. Meurer
Boston University School of Law

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.bu.edu/faculty_scholarship
Part of the Intellectual Property Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Michael J. Meurer, Vertical Restraints and Intellectual Property Law: Beyond Antitrust , in 87 Minnesota
Law Review 1871 (2003).
Available at: https://scholarship.law.bu.edu/faculty_scholarship/784

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by
Scholarly Commons at Boston University School of Law.
It has been accepted for inclusion in Faculty Scholarship
by an authorized administrator of Scholarly Commons at
Boston University School of Law. For more information,
please contact lawlessa@bu.edu.

BOSTON UNIVERSITY
SCHOOL OF LAW
WORKING PAPER SERIES, LAW AND ECONOMICS
WORKING PAPER NO. 03-03

VERTICAL RESTRAINTS AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW:
BEYOND ANTITRUST
MICHAEL J. MEURER

This paper can be downloaded without charge at:
The Boston University School of Law Working Paper Series Index:
http://www.bu.edu/law/faculty/papers
The Social Science Research Network Electronic Paper Collection:
http://ssrn.com/abstract=xxxxxx

VERTICAL RESTRAINTS AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW:
BEYOND ANTITRUST
MICHAEL J. MEURER*
forthcoming 87 Minnesota Law Review (2003)
INTRODUCTION
Sales and licenses of intellectual property (IP) and products
incorporating IP often feature restrictions on use, transfer, and production.1
IP owners have considerable freedom to fashion such restrictions, but they
are constrained by contract and antitrust law as well as by certain doctrines
within IP law.2 The appropriate rigor of the constraints on the freedom of
IP owners to market as they choose is hotly contested within law and
economics.3 Most commentary on this subject focuses on antitrust
oversight, but — at least when it comes to vertical restraints4 — constraints
that are internal to patent and copyright law are far more important. This
Article moves beyond antitrust and explores the extensive regulation of
vertical restraints within IP law.5
There are four important reasons to focus on IP oversight of vertical
restraints separately from antitrust oversight. First, IP law covers a broader
range of vertical restraints. It has broader coverage because it responds to a
———————————————————
* Associate Professor of Law, Boston University Law School. I owe thanks for helpful
comments to participants at the symposium on the interface between antitrust and intellectual property
law at the University of Minnesota Law School. Copyright © 2003 by Michael J. Meurer.
1
Lisa M. Bowman, Court: Network Associates Can't Gag Users, CNET NEWS.COM (January 17,
2003) available at: http://news.com.com/2100-1023-981228.html. (“End-user license agreements have
become a hot-button issue in the tech industry as more and more companies try to forge increasingly
restrictive contracts.”)
2
Louis Kaplow, The Patent-Antitrust Intersection: A Reappraisal, 97 HARV. L. REV. 1813, 1817
(1984) (no exemption from criminal laws for patent license terms).
3
See Richard J. Gilbert & Willard K. Tom, Is Innovation King at the Antitrust Agencies? The
Intellectual Property Guidelines Five Years Later, 69 ANTITRUST L. J. 43 (2001); Michael A. Carrier,
Unraveling the Patent-Antitrust Paradox, 150 U. PENN. L. REV. 761 (2002). See Willard K. Tom &
Joshua A. Newberg, Antitrust and Intellectual Property: From Separate Spheres to Unified Field, 66
ANTITRUST L. J. 167 (1997).
4
Following antitrust terminology, restraints that affect competitors are classified as horizontal,
and restraints that affect users or suppliers are classified as vertical. Much of the antitrust analysis of
vertical restraints addresses the effect of restraints on distributors and retailers. See infra note 10. In
contrast, this Article mainly addresses the effect of restraints on end-users.
5
This Article discusses mostly patent and copyright law; space constraints preclude discussion
of the interesting role of trademark law in regulating vertical restraints.

March 6, 2003

VERTICAL RESTRAINTS AND IP LAW

2

larger set of policy concerns and because it has more regulatory
instruments. Antitrust reaches only certain kinds of vertical restraints that
are especially likely to harm competition. IP law reaches anti-competitive
restraints through the patent and copyright misuse doctrines,6 and it reaches
other vertical restraints that present policy questions usually not addressed
in antitrust. IP law is more versatile than antitrust law because it regulates
in two ways: by specifying entitlements; and by prohibiting certain
contracts or practices.7 Antitrust is limited to prohibitions.
Second, the economic analysis of the antitrust-IP conflict does not
provide an adequate normative framework for analysis of the full range of
IP doctrines affecting vertical restraints.8 Both antitrust and certain IP
doctrines (particularly misuse9) are concerned about the potential of
vertical restraints to exclude downstream competitors.10 But unlike
———————————————————
6

Patent misuse occurs when the patent owner expands the scope or duration of the patent beyond
the rights granted by the patent claims. Misuse can be purged, the patent is unenforceable until the
misuse is purged, and no damages are allowed. Copyright misuse is patterned after patent misuse. The
law of patent misuse recognizes two types of patent extension: the first type involves horizontal
agreements between competitors who control products or processes that compete with the patented
invention; the second type involves vertical restrictions on licensees’ use. WARD S. BOWMAN, JR.,
PATENT AND ANTITRUST LAW 54-56 (1973). HERBERT HOVENKAMP, MARK D. JANIS, & MARK A.
LEMLEY, IP AND ANTITRUST: AN ANALYSIS OF ANTITRUST PRINCIPLES APPLIED TO INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY LAW §20.3 (2002) (distinguishing a vertical restraint from a horizontal restraint by asking
whether competition between the parties is affected).
7
In addition to the misuse doctrine, IP law regulates vertical restraints through: preemption, see
infra text accompanying notes 56, 155, 160; the patent law repair/replace doctrine, see infra text
accompanying notes 116-141; copyright fair use, see infra text accompanying notes 54-71; the
copyright public performance right, see infra text accompanying notes 34, 48-50; the brown bag
exemption to the Plant Variety Protection Act, see Asgrow Seed Co., v. Winterboer, 513 U.S. 179, 192
(1995); the copyright provision governing ties between computers and computer maintenance see infra
text accompanying notes 93-95; the copyright mechanical license provision see infra text
accompanying notes 161-64; the patent and copyright contributory infringement doctrines see infra text
accompanying notes 62, 96-103, 110-15; the copyright doctrine stating RAM copies count as copies
under Section 106(1) see infra text accompanying notes 75-77; the first sale and exhaustion doctrines
see infra text accompanying notes 30-32, 54-56; and copyright amendments restricting record and
software rental see infra text accompanying note 57.
8
Most commentators see the misuse doctrine as an anomalous pocket of quasi-antitrust law that
should be assimilated into antitrust. See LAWRENCE A. SULLIVAN & WARREN S. GRIMES, THE LAW OF
ANTITRUST: AN INTEGRATED HANDBOOK 884 (2000) (favoring identical standards for patent misuse
and antitrust violation in tying cases); HOVENKAMP, ET AL., supra note 6, at §3.2b, 3-7 (misuse occurs
when the patent owner broadens the patent with anti-competitive effect).
9
HOVENKAMP, ET AL., supra note 6, at §1.3, 1-14 (“[N]ot all the cases that fit within the IPantitrust rubric actually involved antitrust at all. The doctrines of patent (and more recently copyright)
misuse serve many of the same purposes as antitrust law…”)
10
The antitrust law of vertical restraints is mainly concerned with the impact of restraints on the
freedom of downstream firms to choose their own distribution strategy. See Andy C. M. Chen & Keith
N. Hylton, Pro-Competitive Theories of Vertical Control, 50 Hastings L.J. 573, 575 (1999). Evidence
for this claim is found by examining the leading private antitrust suits addressing vertical restraints. The
plaintiffs are almost always downstream potential or actual competitors rather than end-users. See e.g.,
Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE-Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 39 (1977) (franchisee); Monsanto v. SprayRite, 465 U.S. 752, 756 (1984) (distributor); Jefferson Parish v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 5 (1984) (excluded
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antitrust, IP doctrines that regulate vertical restraints are often concerned
exclusively with the impact of restraints on end-users. The proper
normative framework resembles consumer protection law more than
antitrust,11 and the relevant question is how to resolve the consumer
protection-IP conflict. Specifically, economic analysis of vertical restraints
and IP law must determine whether IP law should aid a seller’s attempt to
control: the economic life of a durable good;12 sharing of copyrighted
works and patented technology;13 arbitrage that undermines price
discrimination;14 or a user’s decision to exit the relationship.15 I do not
claim that antitrust judges and scholars are completely uninterested in these
issues — only that they are peripheral to core antitrust concerns.
Third, antitrust scrutiny of IP protected markets is in a period of
retrenchment.16 Recently, some commentators have argued that the nature
of competition in high-tech markets justifies a more relaxed antitrust
————————————————————————————————
downstream competitor); Business Electronics v. Sharp, 485 U.S. 717, 721 (1988) (retailer); Eastman
Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Serv. Inc., 504 U.S. 451, 455 (1992) (downstream competitor).
Hovenkamp, Janis, and Lemley list three basic competitive concerns that arise from vertical restraints:
foreclosure, raising rivals’ costs, and facilitation of collusion. See HOVENKAMP ET AL., supra note 6 at
§20.1 p.20-4.
11
See Paul L. Joskow, Transaction Cost Economics, Antitrust Rules, and Remedies, 18 J.L.
Econ. & Org. 95, 102-03 (2002) (contract and consumer protection laws are better suited than antitrust
law to regulate contractual hazards arising in nonstandard vertical relationships); Lisa M. Bowman,
Court: Network Associates Can't Gag Users, CNET News.com (January 17, 2003) available at:
http://news.com.com/2100-1023-981228.html. (State court relied on consumer protection law and
blocked enforcement of a software end-user license agreement that prohibited product reviews and
benchmark tests). See HOVENKAMP, ET AL., supra note 4, at §13.5a (antitrust does not regulate
monopoly pricing per se).
12
See, Malcom B. Coate & Jeffrey Fischer, Can Post-Chicago Economics Survive Daubert, 34
AKRON L. REV. 795, 841-842 (2001) (commenting on the social cost of market power derived from
intellectual property protection which reduces welfare by forcing consumers to replace their durable
goods too quickly).
13
See generally, Michael J. Meurer, Sharing Copyrighted Works, unpublished manuscript on file
with author; see also Michael J. Meurer, Copyright Law and Price Discrimination, 23 CARDOZO L.
REV. 55, 132-40 (2001) [hereinafter Meurer, Price Discrimination] (analyzing whether copyright
owners should be allowed to control sharing by end users); Richard Stern, Post-Sale Patent Restrictions
After Mallinckrodt-An Idea in Search of Definition, 5 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 1, 7 (Stating that the
Mallinckrodt decision created the doctrine that “a patentee may restrict use and disposition of patented
articles and that violation of the restriction is patent infringement unless the restriction violates some
provision of positive law, such as the antitrust laws.”).
14
Hovenkamp, Janis, and Lemley describe price discrimination as a “rejected concern” of the
antitrust law governing vertical restraints. See HOVENKAMP, ET AL., supra note 6, at §20.2c.
15
Cf. J.H. Reichman and Jonathan A. Franklin, Privately Legislated Intellectual Property Rights:
Reconciling Freedom of Contract with Public Goods Uses of Information, 147 U. PA. L. REV. 875, 955957 (1999) (arguing that users should be able to negotiate licensing terms more freely and in some cases
invoke a public-interest unconscionability defense to avoid certain terms).
16
See Linda R. Cohen & Roger G. Noll, Intellectual Property, Antitrust and the New Economy,
62 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 453, 473 (2001) (expressing concern that “in the future antitrust may have little or no
role in high-technology industries, especially with respect to claims regarding monopolization of
vertically related markets.”)
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treatment of those markets.17 In particular, commentators debate whether
vertical restraints connected to IP should be regulated at all.18
Fourth, because IP law uses different instruments it possibly offers
more effective regulation of vertical restraints, and should be used to
complement antitrust regulation.19 IP law frequently offers two cost
advantages over antitrust: less difficulty fashioning an appropriate
remedy;20 and lower rent-seeking costs from opportunistic or anticompetitive litigation.21 Let me illustrate the advantages of IP law by
considering the regulation of price discrimination. Regulation through
antitrust requires a court to identify anti-competitive price discrimination,
specify unacceptable pricing practices in great detail, and monitor
compliance. In contrast, IP law indirectly regulates price discrimination by
encouraging or discouraging arbitrage, e.g., the Supreme Court recently
discouraged geographic price discrimination by refusing to allow copyright
owners to block importation of lawful copyright protected products into the
United States.22 The Court could have reached either decision, and thereby
promoted or discouraged price discrimination without imposing much of an
———————————————————
17

Some argue that competition is different in high-tech markets because market power is
transitory in the face of the gale of creative destruction. Others argue that IP should be expanded and
antitrust contracted to provide greater incentives for innovation. Cf. Linda R. Cohen & Roger G. Noll,
Intellectual Property, Antitrust and the New Economy, 62 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 453, 465 (2001) (explaining
the expansion of IP rights was motivated by a desire to redistribute income in favor of IP owners)
18
See BOWMAN, supra note 6, at 64. Bowman contends that such arrangements simply maximize
legitimate profit attributable to the patent and should not be condemned through application of the
leverage fallacy. Id. HOVENKAMP ET AL., supra note 6, at §20.3, 20-18, 20-19 (properly defined vertical
restraints rarely violate antitrust). But see Linda R. Cohen & Roger G. Noll, Intellectual Property,
Antitrust and the New Economy, 62 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 453, 463-64 (2001) (exemptions to antitrust law,
including the IP exemption have been interpreted narrowly).
19
Antitrust is difficult to administer in hi-tech markets because trials are slow and the technology
is difficult for the court to understand. IP law shares these administrative costs. See Joskow, supra note
11 at 99 (antitrust enforcement agencies do a much better job performing complex economic analysis
than antitrust trial courts).
20
Crafting timely and precise antitrust remedies is a tough job in high-tech industries. See id.
(antitrust remedies may fail to improve efficiency or even make matters worse); id. at 113-14
(reviewing an FTC study that casts doubt on the ability of antitrust enforcement agencies to formulate
effective divestiture policies); RICHARD POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW (1976) 88-91 (explaining social cost
of divestiture as an antitrust remedy); LAWRENCE A. SULLIVAN & WARREN S. GRIMES, THE LAW OF
ANTITRUST: AN INTEGRATED HANDBOOK 77-80 (2000) (divestiture and conduct-based remedies are
difficult to implement effectively); Robert Pitofsky, Antitrust and Intellectual Property: Unresolved
Issues at the Heart of the New Economy, 16 Berkeley Tech. L. J. 535, 547 (2001) (remedies should be
designed so they do not undermine innovation, with a brief duration where appropriate, and to assure
access to a bottleneck product or service).
21
For discussion of the rent-seeking costs associated with private antitrust litigation see POSNER,
supra note 20, at 231-32 (supporting fee-shifting to successful defendants and restrictions of treble
damages in antitrust suits); William J. Baumol & Janus A. Ordover, Use of Antitrust to Subvert
Competition, 28 J. LAW & ECON. 247, 250-51 (1985) (“the social costs of rent-seeking protectionism
can be very high”).
22
See Quality King Distributors, Inc. v. L’anza Research Int’l, Inc., 523 U.S. 135 (1998).
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administrative burden. Rent-seeking through litigation is more of a problem
with antitrust regulation of price discrimination because any rule
determining what sort of price discrimination is anti-competitive is likely to
be quite uncertain. In contrast, the rule about importation of copyrighted
works is relatively certain. Uncertainty about liability encourages
opportunistic antitrust suits and possibly chills legitimate pricing decisions
by sellers.23 Concern about administrative costs and rent-seeking pushed
the courts to restrict antitrust oversight of vertical restraints.24 IP law can be
used to regulate vertical restraints more extensively because it better avoids
these costs.25
This Article is structured into sections that discuss six types of vertical
restraints: restrictions on the field or location of use; restrictions on sharing;
control over the frequency of use; restrictions on repair and modification;
packaging requirements; and impediments to a buyer’s decision to exit its
relationship with a seller. Each section explains how the restraint is
regulated by IP law. Where appropriate, the antitrust treatment of the
restraint is compared to the IP treatment. Finally, the policy issues
presented by each restraint are described. The conclusion compares the
effectiveness of IP law and antitrust law as instruments for regulating
vertical restraints.
I. TYPE OF USE
In markets protected by IP, sellers often segment their buyers based on
line of business, location, field of technology, or whether the use is not-forprofit.26 They implement this segmentation through contract terms that
specify allowable uses. The usual goal of this marketing strategy is price
discrimination.27 Price discrimination occurs when a seller charges
———————————————————
23

See Joskow, supra note 11, at 98-99. Antitrust policy must send clear signals. It is designed to
deter bad behavior — not to “scrutinize, screen, or approve firm behavior or market structures.” Id.
24
See id. at 98 (antitrust law should not be used to regulate most market imperfections because
of the high transaction costs associated with such “mircromanagement”). Measures that control rentseeking litigation sometimes discourage too much socially desirable litigation. See also LAWRENCE A.
SULLIVAN & WARREN S. GRIMES, THE LAW OF ANTITRUST: AN INTEGRATED HANDBOOK 910-13
(2000).
25
IP law creates a temptation for IP owners to engage in anti-competitive litigation — suits with
little merit and the potential to discourage legitimate new competitors. See Michael J. Meurer,
Controlling Opportunistic and Anti-Competitive Intellectual Property Litigation, 45 B. C. L. REV.
forthcoming (2003).
26
ProCD v. Zeidenberg 86 F.3d 1447 (7th Cir. 1996) upholds a consumer use restriction in the
face of a copyright preemption claim. But ProCD is more of a horizontal restraint case than a vertical
restraint case. The goal of the lawsuit was to stop reproduction of data. Id. at 1450. The defendant
offered a competing telephone directory on the Internet. Id..
27
See generally Stanley J. Liebowitz, Copyright Law, Photocopying, and Price Discrimination,
in 8 RESEARCH IN LAW AND ECONOMICS: THE ECONOMICS OF PATENTS AND COPYRIGHTS 181 (John
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different prices to different classes of customers even though the marginal
cost of serving the different classes is the same.28 For example, DuPont
imposed a field of use restriction and charged different prices for a patented
synthetic fiber depending on the end use intended by the customers.29 Price
discrimination allows the seller to increase profit by tailoring prices to
different customer classes that have different preferences.
Whether price discrimination is profitable depends on the cost of
sorting customers into appropriate classes and the cost of blocking
arbitrage. In this context, arbitrage occurs when a customer in a class that is
supposed to pay a high price is able to obtain a product or license at a low
price. A common source of arbitrage is the resale market — a favored
customer purchases at a low price and resells to a disfavored customer.
Arbitrage also occurs when a customer violates a use restriction and the
seller fails to stop the violation.
Price discriminating sellers try to block arbitrage by restricting resale
and by restricting the type of use allowed by favored customers. Sellers can
sue users for breach of contract when they violate license restrictions.
Various IP law doctrines increase the profitability of price discrimination
by further discouraging arbitrage. If the act of arbitrage also violates an IP
right, then sellers can bring more potent infringement claims in addition to
contract claims against arbitrageurs.30 Furthermore, the IP claims are
available against arbitrageurs who are strangers to the seller, thereby
overcoming the privity limitation on contract claims.31
IP law generally facilitates restrictions on types of use, but its effect
on resale restrictions is mixed – sometimes facilitating and sometimes
discouraging resale restrictions. The baseline rule in patent and copyright
law gives buyers the right to transfer products that they purchase. IP
owners can avoid this rule, called the first sale or exhaustion doctrine, by
leasing rather than selling their products.32
————————————————————————————————
Palmer & Richard O. Zerbe, Jr. eds., 1986) (price discrimination in the market for academic journals);
Meurer, Price Discrimination, supra note 13, at 80-90 (describing the pervasive role of copyright law in
both facilitating and impeding price discrimination).
28
See Michael J. Meurer, Price Discrimination, Personal Use and Piracy: Copyright Protection
of Digital Works, 45 BUFFALO L. REV. 845, 869-71 (1997).
29
See Akzo v. Int’l Trade Comm., 808 F.2d 1471 (Fed. Cir. 1986).
30
See Mallinckrodt, Inc. v. Medipart, Inc., 976 F.2d 700, 709 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
31
See David Nimmer, Elliot Brown, & Gary N. Frischling, The Metamorphosis of Contract into
Expand, 87 CALIF. L. REV. 17, 35 (1999) Delta and Pine Land Co. v. Sinkers Corp., 177 F.3d 1343,
(Fed. Cir. 1999) (discussing requirements for third party liability for sales that violate a PVPA
certificate).
32
See Communications Groups v. Warner Communications, Inc., 527 N.Y.S.2d 341 (Civ. Ct.
N.Y. 1998) (negotiated software agreement characterized as a lease even though the document
described the agreement as a license); Joseph P. Liu, Owning Digital Copies: Copyright Law and the
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Resale across national borders is treated distinctly from domestic
resale. Copyright provides an importation right but it is limited by the first
sale doctrine.33 The copyright owner can block unauthorized imports, but
cannot block authorized copies that are imported back into the U.S.34 This
forces a copyright owner to rely on contract law to block arbitrage against
geographic price discrimination. Trademark law provides similar treatment
of so-called gray market goods.35 A United States trademark holder may
bar the importation of goods bearing the same trademark when
manufactured by a foreign manufacturer but cannot stop importation of
goods made under the control of the domestic trademark holder.36 In
contrast, the Patent Act prohibits any importation of a patented product into
the U.S, and greatly facilitates geographic price discrimination.37
Patent law broadly facilitates restrictions on type of use while
copyright gives more limited support. A patent owner has the right to
exclude others from use of a patented invention. The predominant view in
patent law states that because the patent owner can exclude all use, the
statute gives an implied right to grant permission for some uses and still sue
the licensee for infringement if she engages in an unauthorized use.38
Copyright law enumerates certain uses that are the exclusive right of the
copyright owner. Most relevant for this discussion of vertical restraints is
the public performance right.39 This right facilitates price discrimination in
the movie and music markets between home users and buyers who want to
engage in a public performance, e.g., exhibiting a movie in a theater or
————————————————————————————————
Incidents of Copy Ownership, 42 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 1245, 1301-02 (2001) (discussing resale and the
right of alienation). Resale is not a problem for IP owners who license information rather than sell a
product because they can preclude any transfer in the license. See Ray T. Nimmer, Uniform Computer
Information Transactions Act and Electronic Commerce: Licensing in the Contemporary Information
Economy, 8 WASH. U. J.L. & POL'Y 99, 119 n.39 (comparing sales, leases, and licenses).
33
See Quality King Distributors, Inc. v. L'anza Research Int'l, Inc., 523 U.S. 135 (1998).
34
See id., at 145.
35
See Kmart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc., 486 U.S. 281 (1988).
36
See id. at 292. The trend in Europe favors gray markets and opposes the use of intellectual
property to facilitate international price discrimination. See S.O. Spinks, Exclusive Dealing,
Discrimination, and Discounts Under EC Competition Law, 67 ANTITRUST L.J. 641, 666-67 (2000).
37
See Section 271(a). Section 271(g) also prohibits importation of a product made with a
patented process, even if the process was used outside of the U.S. with permission. See Ajinomoto Co.
v. Archer-Daniels-Midland Co., 228 F.3d 1338, 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
38
See BOWMAN, supra note 6, at 140-42 (arguing that an absolute right to exclude use implies a
right to impose any conditions on the use of a patented invention); Kaplow, supra note 2, at 1846
(arguing against this view and claiming it “has gradually fallen into disfavor in the patent-antitrust
context”). The implied right is made explicit regarding restrictions on location of use. See 35 U.S.C.
§261.
39
Section 106(4) gives music composition copyright owners the right to control public
performance of their music. See 17 U.S.C. §106(4).
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broadcasting music on the radio.40
Compared to IP law, antitrust oversight of price discrimination is
relatively passive. Antitrust plaintiffs had some success in the 1960s. In one
notable case the owner of a patent on shrimp peeling machinery leased
machines to Gulf Coast shrimp companies for half the rental rate that it
charged Pacific Coast shrimp companies.41 The Fifth Circuit found this
geographic price discrimination violated Section Five of the FTC Act
because it injured competition in the shrimp canning business.42
Hovenkamp, Janis, and Lemley doubt the case would have come out the
same way today.43 They review recent cases and conclude that antitrust law
permits price discrimination in patent licenses, but the sale of patented
goods is still governed by the Robinson-Patman Act.44 The RobinsonPatman Act is also occasionally applied to goods that incorporate
copyrighted expression, like books and video cassettes,45 but it has not had
much impact on IP protected markets.46
Patent and copyright law permit contract restrictions based on location
and type of use, but patent law goes further than copyright law to
encourage sellers to impose those restrictions by creating a strong
importation right and a broad right to control use of a patented invention.
To assess the economic significance of these differences one needs to
examine the social welfare effects of these restraints. A common view
among antitrust commentators is that sellers segment customer classes to
achieve some distributional efficiency.47 The same argument is pressed by
copyright and trademark owners who oppose importation of gray market
goods.48 They argue exclusive territories are established to encourage

———————————————————
40

See Meurer, Price Discrimination, supra note 13, at 109-16.
See Lapeyre v. F.T.C, 366 F.2d 117 (5th Cir. 1966).
42
See id. at 121. But see HOVENKAMP ET AL., supra note 6, at §13.5 (expressing doubt that this
case is good law today.)
43
See HOVENKAMP ET AL., supra note 6, at §13.5.
44
See HOVENKAMP ET AL., supra note 6, at §23.4 p. 23-35. Courts have rejected claims that price
discrimination constitutes a form of misuse. Id. at §3.3b7; USM Corp. v. SPS Technologies, 694 F.2d
505 (7th Cir. 1982) (a patentee is entitled to use price discrimination to maximize its profit).
45
See HOVENKAMP ET AL., supra note 6, at §13.5
46
See Meurer, Digital Works, supra note 28, at 871; William W. Fisher III, Property and
Contract on the Internet, 73 CHI.-KENT L. REV 1203, 1255 (1998).
47
See BOWMAN, supra note 6, at 61-62, 64-139 (use restrictions in patent licenses promote
efficiency).
48
In Quality King the copyright owner sold shampoo with copyrighted labels on the shampoo
bottles. See Quality King Distributors, Inc. v. L'anza Research Int'l, Inc., 523 U.S. 135, 138 (1998). The
shampoo manufacturer argued that exclusive geographic markets were justified because of the
divergent marketing strategies used in the U.S. and abroad. Id. at 269-70.
41
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investment by distributors in local goodwill and service.49 The empirical
evidence suggests, however, that gray markets arise to arbitrage geographic
price discrimination.50 Thus, the relevant policy issue is whether IP law
should encourage geographic, field of use, and similar forms of price
discrimination.
IP scholars have developed a recent fascination with the policy effects
of price discrimination in IP-protected markets.51 Some embrace price
discrimination because it has the potential to increase profit and the
incentive to create, and simultaneously increase output. Others are skeptical
because of its distributional implications, or because it may actually cause
output to fall.52 It is possible that patent law’s greater solicitude for price
discrimination is explained by the perception that the extra profit from
price discrimination is especially valuable as an incentive to invent
(specifically to invent pharmaceuticals, an industry that practices extensive
price discrimination53). Perhaps the same incentive argument is not as
persuasive in copyright protected markets.
Two other policy considerations are important in shaping optimal IP
policy. First, any decision to expand the scope of IP rights increases the
social costs associated with opportunistic and anti-competitive IP litigation.
Converting a simple contract claim into a patent or copyright infringement
claim gives the IP owner significant strategic advantages because of the
threat of preliminary and permanent injunction, fee-shifting, and treble

———————————————————
49

See Nancy T. Gallini & Aidan Hollis, A Contractual Approach to the Gray Market, 19 INT'L
REV. L. & ECON. 1, 4-5 (1999). Such an efficiency justification was raised by the copyright owner in
Quality King, but it was not very persuasive. The empirical evidence establishes that geographic price
discrimination is common and is probably the most important cause of gray market transactions.
50
See id. at 6 (explaining that empirical evidence shows that price discrimination is probably the
most important cause of gray market transactions); David A. Malueg & Marius Schwartz, Parallel
Imports, Demand Dispersion, and International Price Discrimination, 37 J. INT'L ECON. 167, 173-74
(1994) (reviewing empirical evidence and concluding that arbitrage against price discrimination is a
significant source of gray market activity).
51
See William W. Fisher III, Reconstructing the Fair Use Doctrine, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1661
(1988); Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., Reexamining Copyright's Incentives-Access Paradigm, 49 Vand. L. Rev.
483, 630-34 (1996); Meurer, Digital Works, supra note 28; Fisher, supra note 40; Wendy J. Gordon,
Intellectual Property as Price Discrimination: Implications for Contract, 73 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 1367
(1998) Meurer, Price Discrimination; Julie E. Cohen, Copyright and the Perfect Curve, 53 VAND. L.
REV. 1799 (2000); James Boyle, Cruel, Mean, or Lavish? Economic Analysis, Price Discrimination and
Digital Intellectual Property, 53 VAND. L. REV. 2007 (2000); Yochai Benkler, An Unhurried View of
Private Ordering in Information Transactions, 53 VAND. L. REV. 2063 (2000).
52
See Kaplow, supra note 2, at 1873-78 (discussing the effect on social welfare of price
discrimination by a patent owner).
53
See Claude E. Barfield & Mark A. Groombridge, Parallel Trade in the Pharmaceutical
Industry: Implications for Innovation, Consumer Welfare, and Health Policy, 10 FORDHAM INTELL.
PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 185, 194-96 (1999).
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damages for willful infringement.54 Furthermore, IP rights can be asserted
against innocent strangers (perhaps importers) who might be vulnerable to
an opportunistic IP suit. These rent-seeking costs need to be balanced
against any incentive benefit before IP rights are expanded to support price
discrimination.
Second, IP law can channel sellers into choosing a socially beneficial
form of price discrimination rather than a socially harmful form.55
Copyright’s public performance right serves this function. If the public
performance right were deleted from the statute, music and movie
producers would find another, more costly, way to discriminate between
buyers intending to publicly perform the work, and buyers intending only
private use. One possibility would be a very high initial sales price
followed after a significant delay with a lower sales price targeted at home
users. Another possibility would be vertical integration into movie
exhibition or radio broadcast. The public performance right allows
discrimination and avoids the high implementation costs associated with
the other strategies.
A related point is that copyright can shape the distributional effects of
price discrimination by building exemptions into a right. Section 110
provides various exemptions to the public performance right to promote
educational and nonprofit performances,56 and other exemptions that might
be explained by relatively high transaction costs compared to the value of
the public performance to the user.57 Thus, copyright effectively supports
price discrimination to the bulk of users intending a public performance,
while sheltering certain users to advance various policy goals.
Appropriately, antitrust regulation of type of use restraints is quite
limited. Hovenkamp contends that: “[T]he costs of preventing price
discrimination without any accompanying exclusionary conduct would
almost certainly outweigh any benefits, particularly if the market is
competitive or oligopolistic.”58 The basic difficulty with the RobinsonPatman approach is that it puts courts in an uncomfortable position as price
regulators. In contrast, IP law works in the background by encouraging or
discouraging arbitrage.59
———————————————————
54

See Michael J. Meurer, Controlling Opportunistic and Anti-Competitive Intellectual Property
Litigation, forthcoming 45 B.C. L. Rev. (2003).
55
See Meurer, Price Discrimination, supra, note 13, at 104-05.
56
See 17 U.S.C. §110.
57
See Meurer, Price Discrimination, supra, note 13, at 114-16.
58
HERBERT HOVENKAMP, FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY: THE LAW OF COMPETITION AND ITS
PRACTICE §14.5a (1999).
59
One important role is prohibition of territorial or field of use restrictions that promote
cartelization. See Kaplow, supra note 2 at, 1879.
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II. LENDING AND PRIVATE REPRODUCTION
Copyright law has been racked by controversies regarding the rights
of buyers and sellers with regard to sharing. Even use of the term sharing is
controversial.60 I use it to describe various types of coalitions formed by
consumers for consumption of copyrighted works. I define sharing as any
activity such that a single copy of a work provides utility to a small number
of end users in addition to the purchaser. This section addresses two
common sources of sharing: lending and private reproduction.61
Copyright law displays much ambivalence toward sharing. It would
seem that private reproduction runs afoul of the reproduction right
specified in Section 106(1), but many forms of private reproduction are
privileged by statutory exemptions or the fair use defense.62 It would also
seem that buyers are permitted to lend copies that they purchase under the
first sale doctrine, but that right is limited by amendments that preclude
commercial lending of music and software.63 Regulation of sharing is
further complicated by enforcement problems. Copyright law recognizes
the difficulty of enforcement against small scale sharing, and allows
copyright owners to sue parties who contribute to copyright infringement
by providing reproduction technology or otherwise facilitating illicit
sharing.64
Library lending is the oldest significant source of sharing. The first
sale doctrine gives libraries the right to lend books and other copyrighted
material in their collections.65 But the nature of library sharing may soon
change drastically as libraries incorporate more digital content into their
collections. The contracts governing the transactions for digital content
usually include terms that restrict transfer. The copyright owners argue that
the first sale doctrine does not apply to digital transactions because they
license rather than sell their products. The Uniform Computer Information
Transactions Act and some cases approve of this theory. In other cases
———————————————————
60

See Michael J. Madison, Sharing and Copyright: Language and Practice, unpublished
manuscript on file with author (2002).
61
See Michael J. Meurer, Sharing Copyrighted Works, unpublished manuscript on file with
author (2003).
62
See 17. U.S.C. §107 (fair use doctrine); 17. U.S.C. §108 (library exemption); 17. U.S.C. §117
(archival copies of software).
63
See 17 U.S.C. §109(b)(1)(A).
64
See Sony Corp. of Amer. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 434-42 (1984).
65
Many European countries give the copyright owner a lending right that provides a fee based on
the volume of lending activity. See Jane C. Ginsburg, Reproduction of Protected Works for University
Research or Teaching, 39 J. Copyright Soc’y 181, 196 (1992) (describing Nordic country photocopy
license fees set as a price per page copied, as a lump sum payment from each user, or occasionally as
lump sum per inhabitant or per student).
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courts characterize the purported licenses as sales and refuse to enforce the
resale restrictions.66
The music and software industries obtained copyright amendments
that bar unauthorized commercial music and software rental.67 A puzzling
contrast in U.S. copyright law is that commercial video rental is permitted
without permission from movie copyright owners. The movie industry was
not successful when it lobbied for an amendment comparable to the
amendments obtained by the music and software industries.68 In many
other countries, copyright law does give copyright owners control over
movie rental.69
The introduction of reproduction technology to consumer markets
made private reproduction another significant source of sharing. The
photocopier added a new dimension to library-based sharing; now patrons
can reproduce a portion of a text in addition to borrowing a text. Much
photocopying does not infringe copyright because of the fair use doctrine
or because of statutory exemptions for libraries.70 The fair use doctrine is a
multi-factor balancing test that allows copying that achieves certain
socially desirable purposes provided the effect on copyright owners’
incentives are not too severe. Spontaneous, non-commercial, and academic
photocopying tends to be fair. Systematic and commercial photocopying
tends to be infringing.71
Consumers share music and video by making and exchanging private
copies. Such sharing has become routine, but the first important case on the
question was hotly disputed and decided by a five to four vote in the
Supreme Court. In Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios the
Court held private copying of television programs may be a fair use.72
Specifically, it is fair use for consumers to videotape television programs
———————————————————
66

See Microsoft Corp. v. Harmony Computers & Electronics, Inc., 846 F.Supp. 208 (E.D.N.Y.
1994) (refusing to apply first sale doctrine to software license); Novell, Inc. v. Network Trade Center,
25 F.Supp. 2d 1218 (D. Utah 1997) (refusing to enforce shrink-wrap term that purported to limit the
first sale doctrine); Nimmer, et al., supra note 31, at 34-40.
67
Recorded music cannot be rented without permission from the copyright owner. Record Rental
Amendment of 1984. 98 Stat. 1727; 17 U.S.C. §109(b)(1)(A). The Computer Software Rental
Amendments Act of 1990 prohibits unauthorized rental of many types of software. 104 Stat. 5089; 17
U.S.C. §109(b)(1)(A).
68
See Robert A. Rosenbloum, The Rental Rights Directive: A Step in the Right and Wrong
Directions, 15 Loy. L. A. Ent. L. J. 547, 578 (1995); MELVILLE B. NIMMER, DAVID NIMMER,
NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, §8.12[B][7][a] (2000).
69
See Rosenbloum, supra note 68, at 551.
70
Extensive photocopying of medical journals at the National Institutes of Health and the
National Library of Medicine was judged to be a fair use in Williams & Wilkins v. U.S, 487 F.2d 1345
(Ct. Cl. 1973), aff’d by an equally divided Court 420 U.S. 376 (1975) (per curiam).
71
See, American Geophysical Union v. Texaco, 60 F.3d 913 (2nd Cir. 1994).
72
464 U.S. 417 (1984).
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so they can view them at some time after the broadcast.73 Many other
countries initially found such copying was infringing, and then revised their
copyright statutes to allow private copying, but they also collect taxes on
recording media and devices and give the tax revenue to copyright
owners.74
The much publicized Napster case indicates some of the limits on
personal reproduction rights.75 The Ninth Circuit found that personal
reproduction and exchange of digital music files over an anonymous
Internet file-sharing service is not fair use.76 Additionally, the court ruled
the company Napster was indirectly liable for copyright infringement
because it provided software and services that facilitated unlawful filesharing.77 In contrast, Sony was not liable for the sale of video recorders.
Although video recorders can be used to make unlawful copies, since they
are capable of a substantial non-infringing use, there is no contributory
infringement.78
The antitrust approach to regulation of sharing asks whether vertical
restraints on private reproduction and transfer cause anti-competitive
effects to distributors or potential competitors in downstream markets. The
answer in most of the interesting cases is clearly no, thus there is not much
of a role for antitrust.79 In contrast, economic analysis of copyright law asks
———————————————————
73

The Court approved of “time-shifting” as purpose deserving protection under the fair use
doctrine. Id. at 454-55. There has been relatively little written by U.S. courts but a great deal written by
law professors that approves of time-shifting and other personal uses as fair use. See e.g., Deborah
Tussey, From Fan Sites to Filesharing: Personal Use in Cyberspace, 35 GA. L. REV. 1129, 1181-89
(2001) (advocating a statutory personal use privilege).
74
Generally, European nations have copyright provisions that permit private copying but also
impose taxes on copying equipment and media that is paid to copyright owners. See Edmund L.
Andrews, Fight Free Music, Europeans Take Aim at Personal Computers, N. Y. TIMES, Feb. 13, 2001,
at A1 (many European countries impose copyright fees on audio and videocassette recorders and blank
tapes). For example, the taxes collected on blank audiotapes and audio recording equipment is paid to
music copyright owners. See Eugen Ulmer and Hans Hugo von Rauscher Germany (Federal Republic)
in International Copyright and Neighboring Rights, eds. Stephen Stewart and Hamish Sandison, 422
(1989). Germany taxes photocopy machines and each copy by libraries or schools to cover copying
losses to copyright owners. Id. at 422-23. Spain imposes a tax on equipment and media to pay for
private copying. Edward Thompson, Spain, in International Copyright and Neighboring Rights, eds.
Stephen Stewart and Hamish Sandison, 367 (1989). Many countries embrace the notion that “personal”
use of copyrighted works is outside of the scope of copyright protection. See Computer Science and
Telecommunications Board, National Research Council, THE DIGITAL DILEMMA: INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY IN THE INFORMATION AGE 129 (2000).
75
A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d. 1004 (9th Cir. 2001).
76
See id. at 1018-19.
77
See id. at 1020-24.
78
See Sony 464 U.S. at 456.
79
Antitrust does not directly regulate restraints on sharing, but it may have some indirect effect.
Companies that facilitate sharing have been targeted with contributory infringement suits and have
responded with antitrust claims. See John Borland, Kazaa Strikes Back at Hollywood, Labels, Cnet
New.com (Jan. 28, 2003) available at: http://news.com.com/2100-1023-982344.html. The owner of
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what pattern of rights relating to sharing maximizes expected total surplus.
This question must be answered by copyright law (at least implicitly)
because the law must set some pattern of entitlements.
Optimal policy toward sharing tries to satisfy two goals that are often
in conflict: provide an appropriate incentive for the creation of copyrighted
works, and maximize total surplus from dissemination of these products
once they are created. A policy that always forbids sharing without
permission is probably not optimal. It does have the desirable effect of
maximizing the incentive for creation. But a right to share may be socially
desirable because the current incentive for creation is too large, or because
giving users the right to share causes total surplus to grow significantly
relative to the loss of profit-based incentive.80 Normally, when sharing
raises both profit and ex post surplus it is socially desirable and should be
encouraged, and similarly, it should be discouraged when it depresses both
profit and ex post surplus.81 When sharing erodes profit and raises ex post
surplus the optimal policy is hard to determine, but encouraging sharing is
more likely to be socially desirable when the surplus gain is large and the
profit loss is small.82
The effect of sharing on profit depends to a large extent on how
sharing affects demand for the copyrighted work. Sharing affects demand
by reducing the number of buyers, increasing the valuations that buyers
assign to the product, and lowering or avoiding transaction costs.
Valuations rise because most buyers value the opportunity to share in
addition to the opportunity to consume the product directly.83 In some
————————————————————————————————
music file-sharing service Kazaa sued members of the music industry for copyright misuse and antitrust
violations and is seeking to bar enforcement of their music copyrights. Id. The claim is based on the
music industry’s alleged refusal to provide copy-protected music files for distribution over the Kazaa
network. Id. The district court judge in the Napster case found evidence that the music industry might
have violated the antitrust laws in the market for digital music distribution. Id. The Department of
Justice is also investigating music industry activities in markets for digital music. Id.
80
The Ninth Circuit in Sony Corp. of Amer. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 659 F.2d 963, 970
th
(9 Cir. 1981), and the dissent in the Supreme Court decision that reversed the Ninth Circuit, 464 U.S.
417, 475 (1984) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) argued that the fair use doctrine should never apply to
reproductive uses of copyrighted works that enable some types of sharing. The majority rejected this
view stating that even some unauthorized time-shifting is not infringing and that fair-use requires a
balancing of interests which showed that the social benefits outweighed the costs. Id. at 448, 455.
81
This statement does not hold if current incentives for creation are too large. If so, then it might
be socially desirable to reduce profit (and the accompanying incentive to create) even if that also means
reducing total surplus. See Meurer, Price Discrimination, supra note 13 at 95-97.
82
Kaplow looks at the ratio of total surplus change to profit change when formulating an optimal
patent policy, see Kaplow, supra note 2, at 1829-39, and Fisher follows the same approach when
analyzing the fair use doctrine, see Fisher, supra note 46 at 1706-17.
83
In some markets, valuations also rise because of consumption externalities. A consumption
externality implies that a buyer’s direct utility rises when the number of other consumers using the
product rises. See Kathleen R. Conner & Richard P. Rumelt, Software Piracy: An Analysis of Protection
Strategies, 37 MGMT. SCI. 125, 133, 136 (1991) (sharing may increase profit because of network
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cases, sharing opens the market to new users who otherwise would be
excluded because of transaction costs. Finally, sharing may either facilitate
or impede the seller’s effort to sort consumers into separate groups and
charge discriminatory prices.84
Optimal copyright regulation of sharing must balance the rights of
users and sellers. Sellers would be happiest with complete control over
sharing, then they could authorize lending, private reproduction, and other
activities that contribute to sharing if and only if they increased sellers’
profit. But buyers should have the right to share without permission when
the sellers’ profit incentive is misaligned with the social interest in
maximizing total surplus. This might occur when users are excluded from a
market by high transaction costs,85 when sharing undermines inefficient
price discrimination,86 or when buyer coalitions exert countervailing
market power that offsets seller market power and increases output.87
These policy considerations are critical to a proper fair use analysis of
sharing. Fair use balances four factors: (1) purpose; (2) nature of the work;
(3) amount of the work used; and (4) market effect.88 Fair use addresses the
impact of sharing on incentives for creation through the second and fourth
factors. Courts evaluate the nature of a work to see whether it requires
strong incentives for creation, and the market effect to identify the impact
of sharing on profit. Together these factors lead to a judgment about the
impact of sharing on incentives to create. Fair use addresses the impact of
sharing on ex post total surplus through the first factor. For example, courts
recognize that private copying can be justified as a way to avoid transaction
costs. Courts have not considered whether disruption of inefficient price
discrimination or creation of countervailing market power are purposes
favoring fair use — but the open-ended nature of the balancing test would
permit this sort of analysis.

————————————————————————————————
effects); Lisa Takeyama, The Welfare Implications of Unauthorized Reproduction of Intellectual
Property in the Presence of Network Externalities, 62 J. INDUSTR. ECON. 155 (1994) (same).
84
A subtler but equally important concern is the impact of sharing on the dispersion of buyers’
valuations. Increasing dispersion tends to increase inefficiency. Sharing sometimes makes the
valuations of potential buyers more homogenous and smoothes demand; other times it increases
heterogeneity and the dispersion of demand. See Yannis Bakos, et al., Shared Information Goods, 42 J.
L. ECON. 117 (1999). Sharing might also be an efficient method of distributing a good. See Janusz A.
Ordover & Robert D. Willig, On the Optimal Provision of Journals qua Sometimes Shared Goods, 68
AMER. ECON REV. 324 (1978).
85
See Gordon, supra note 45, at 1387.
86
Meurer, Price Discrimination, supra note 13, at 12.
87
Meurer, Sharing Copyrighted Works, supra note 13, at x.
88
See 17. U.S.C. §107.
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III. FREQUENCY OF USE
Sellers are motivated to control frequency of use because it aids price
discrimination. Buyers who use a product more frequently are likely to
have a higher valuation and be willing to pay more. Ideally a seller would
just ask prospective buyers how frequently they plan to use a product, and
then charge more to high frequency users. Of course, buyers may not know
the answer to that question at the time of purchase, and they have an
incentive to understate their planned usage. Thus, IP owners employ
several different strategies to monitor and control frequency of use.
One approach is to control frequency of use directly through contract.
A seller could specify an increasing schedule of prices associated with an
increasing frequency of permissible use.89 Contractual use restrictions are
difficult to enforce because it is difficult to detect violations. IP law
bolsters frequency of use restrictions by adding infringement claims and
strong IP remedies to the breach of contract claims.90 Infringement claims
are well grounded in patent law because the patent owner has broad control
over use.91 Copyright law does not offer a comparably broad use right but
in some important settings unauthorized use is infringing. Computers (and
other consumer electronic devices) usually make a temporary copy of
digital content or software during use. Even though temporary, such a copy
may be infringing.92 Thus, a digital copyright owner can sue a buyer who
violates a frequency of use restriction for breach of contract, and also for
copyright infringement because of the unauthorized temporary
reproductions. Copyright law imposes two important limits on these
infringement claims. Section 117 gives software owners the right to make
copies as an essential step in using a program,93 and the copyright misuse

———————————————————
89

Digital technology makes this possible for digital content, and it is possible this marketing
approach will become common in the not too distant future. See Tom W. Bell, Fair Use vs. Fared Use:
The Impact of Automated Rights Management on Copyright's Fair Use Doctrine, 76 NO. CAR. L. REV.
557, 565-67 (1998); Meurer, supra note 28, at 878-79. One attempt with digital video failed to win
consumer acceptance. See Joel Brinkley, Few Tears are Shed as Divx Joins the 8-Track, N. Y. TIMES,
Feb. 13, 2001, at G6.
90
See Mallinckrodt, Inc. v. Medipart, Inc., 976 F.2d 700, 709 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (ruling that
violation of the single use requirement was patent infringement as well as contract breach).
91
See BOWMAN, supra note 6, at 142-46 (1973) (reading exhaustion cases to permit patent
restrictions on use after sale as long as the restrictions are explicit).
92
See MAI Systems Corp. v. Peak Computer, Inc., 991 F.2d 511, 518 (9th Cir. 1993) (the copy
of software created in RAM memory during execution is sufficiently fixed to qualify for copyright
protection).
93
17 U.S.C. §117. The MAI court held that a licensee is not an owner so Section 117 did not
apply. Courts have refused to adopt this approach for mass-market software.
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doctrine might prevent a seller from circumventing the first sale doctrine.94
More commonly, sellers control frequency of use indirectly through
the sale of some complementary product that is used with the IP protected
product. Sellers require buyers to purchase the complementary product (1)
through a tying contract, (2) because of product design, or (3) by threat of
an infringement suit against a competing supplier. The classic illustration
of contractual tying and price discrimination comes from the antitrust tying
case IBM Corp. v. U.S.95 IBM leased patented tabulator machines on the
condition that the lessee purchase all of the punch cards needed for use in
the machines from IBM.96 Punch card purchases measured frequency of
use. Rather than charging a rental rate that varied directly with frequency of
use, IBM charged a premium over the competitive price for punch cards,
and thereby indirectly collected a rental rate that increased with the
frequency of use.97 IBM could have implemented essentially the same
pricing scheme by installing a counter on each machine that recorded the
number of cards processed, or by requiring lessees to record and report how
many cards they used (or some other measure of frequency of use). No
doubt they chose the punch card tie because it was less costly and more
reliable.98
Antitrust law treats tying contracts as per se illegal, but actually
imposes a relatively mild check. A tying contract is unlawful if: there are
truly separate tied and tying products; the seller has market power in the
tying product market; and there are anticompetitive effects in the tied
product market.99 Older cases like IBM found ties that appear to implement
price discrimination to be unlawful,100 but recent courts have been quite
tolerant. “[T]he great majority of decisions conclude that the simple fact
———————————————————
94

See Brett Frischmann & Dan Moylan, The Evolving Common Law Doctrine of Copyright
Misuse: A Unified Theory and Its Application to Software, 15 Berkeley Tech. L.J. 865 (2000). Cf. Julie
E. Cohen & Mark A. Lemley, Patent Scope and Innovation in the Software Industry, 89 Cal. L. Rev. 1,
32 (2001) (the exhaustion and implied license doctrines are meaningless in the software context if
making a RAM copy or other temporary copy amounts to an infringing “making”).
95
298 U.S. 131 (1936).
96
Id. at 134.
97
Id. at 139. The same type of price discrimination was practiced in Motion Picture Patents Co.
v. Universal Film Mfg., 243 U.S. 502 (1917). Movie projectors were tied to film, and the patent owner
derived most of its profit from the sale of film. Id. at 515.
98
A similar fact pattern was described in Morton Salt Co. v. G.S. Suppinger Co., 314 U.S. 488
(1942). The lease of a patented canning machine was tied to the sale of salt tablets. Salt sales meter
intensity of use of canning machine. Perhaps the lessor wanted to control the salt used in the leased
machines to prevent harm caused by inferior salt.
99
The plaintiff must also show evidence of actual coercion that forced the buyer to accept the tie,
and that the tied product market involves interstate commerce.
100
See Telex Corp. v. IBM Corp., 510 F.2d 894 (10th Cir.), cert. dismissed, 423 U.S. 802, x
(1975).
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that a tie causes price discrimination is not sufficient for illegality.”101 The
patent and copyright misuse doctrines evaluate tying claims essentially the
same way as antitrust law. 102
Sellers can use product design to implement a technological rather
than a contractual tie. This approach works when the seller offers a system
containing two components that interact through an interface that the seller
designs so it is difficult for a third party to make a compatible tied product.
The tied component is consumed by users and must be replaced frequently.
The seller monitors frequency of use through sales of the consumable
component. For example, a medical device manufacturer named Bard
apparently used the sale of biopsy needles to measure the frequency of use
of a gun that inserted the needles.103 Bard violated Section Two of the
Sherman Act by changing the interface between the gun and the needles to
exclude other needle manufacturers.104 Section Two of the Sherman Act
regulates tying through interface design; there is no basis for Section One
oversight because design choices are unilateral. Section Two oversight is
significantly limited by the requirement that the defendant possess
monopoly power,105 and by antitrust courts’ reluctance to meddle with
innovation.106
IP law regulates the development and creation of product interfaces
and thereby facilitates or discourages product design based tying. Patent
and trade secret law protect product interfaces. A seller can block all use of
a patented interface, but reverse engineering is allowed if the interface is
protected as a trade secret.107 Reverse engineering of software interfaces
requires making a copy of the interface software. Sellers have tried to use
———————————————————
101

See HOVENKAMP, ET AL., supra note 6, at §21.2.
102
See id. at §3.1, 3-2 (antitrust and patent misuse are closely linked); Morton Salt Co. v. G.S.
Suppinger Co., 314 U.S. 488 (1942) (alleged infringer invoked the doctrine of patent misuse to block
enforcement of the patent). Patent misuse is not the same as the equitable doctrine of unclean hands for
two reasons: the patentee loses both injunctive remedies and damages; and the whole patent is
unenforceable against any infringer. The Federal Circuit established three categories that apply to
misuse analysis. See Virginia Panel v. MAC Panel, 133 F.3d 860, 869 (Fed. Cir. 1997). Certain
restraints (tying and extending the patent term) are per se misuse. Other restraints are per se legal under
section 271(d). Restraints that do not fall into the first two categories either: do not broaden “the scope
of the patent claims and thus cannot constitute patent misuse;” or do broaden the scope of the patent
claims are constitute misuse if they have an anti-competitive effect under a rule of reason analysis. Id.
103
See C.R. Bard, Inc. v. M3 Sys., Inc., 157 F.3d 1340, 1382-83 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
104
See id.
105
See generally Telex Corp. v. IBM Corp., 510 F.2d 894 (10th Cir.), cert. dismissed, 423 U.S.
802, 919 (1975).
106
See e.g.., Telex Corp. v. IBM Corp., 510 F.2d 894 (10th Cir.), cert. dismissed, 423 U.S. 802
(1975); Berkey Photo v. Eastman Kodak Co., 603 F.2d 263 (2nd Cir. 1979). But see C.R. Bard v. M3
Systems, 157 F.3d 1340, 1382 (Fed. Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 526 U.S. 1130 (1999).
107
See Telex Corp. v. IBM Corp., 510 F.2d 894 (10th Cir.), cert. dismissed, 423 U.S. 802, 928-30
(1975) (trade secret law protects interfaces).
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copyright law to block the reverse engineering, but courts have denied
infringement claims under the fair use doctrine.108 Finally, sellers have had
mixed success with contracts that precluded reverse engineering.109
Another, more doubtful, strategy for protecting a product interface is a
claim based on Section 1201(a) of the DMCA. That section creates a right
prohibiting circumvention of means that control access to copyrighted
works.110 Recently, a printer manufacturer filed a lawsuit in which it seeks
to use the DMCA to control the market for replacement ink cartridges.111
The claim has some plausibility because the software incorporated in the
interface is copyrightable subject matter, but there is a strong argument that
the lawsuit improperly extends the scope of copyright to the market for
replacement ink cartridges and therefore violates the misuse doctrine or
antitrust law.112
The final approach to controlling frequency of use relies on the threat
of IP suits against competing suppliers of the tied product. An example in
copyright law is presented in MAI Systems Corp. v. Peak Computer, Inc.113
MAI sold computers containing their copyrighted operating system. They
tied maintenance service to the computer by suing Peak, a third party
maintenance provider, for copyright infringement.114 The infringement
———————————————————
108

The leading case is Sega v. Accolade, 977 F.2d 1510 (9th Cir. 1992). .Plaintiff Sega makes
and sells the Genesis console and video game cartridges. Accolade makes game cartridges that run on
different types of consoles. Sega licenses independent game makers but did not license Accolade.
Accolade reverse engineered the Sega video game programs to discover the requirements for
compatibility and then made compatible game cartridges. The court held that copying and disassembly
to discover functional compatibility requirements constitutes a fair use.
109
See Lasercomb America, Inc. v. Reynolds, 911 F.2d 970 (4th Cir. 1990); DSC
Communications v. DGI Technologies, 81 F.3d 597 (5th Cir. 1996); Bowers v. BayState Technologies,
Inc., 302 F.3d 1344 (Fed. Cir. 2003). In Vault Corp. v. Quaid Software Ltd., 847 F.2d 255 (5th Cir.
1988) the court applied Section 117(1) to reverse engineering. In other cases, courts have read 117 to
apply only to temporary copies associated with approved uses of the software. Cohen & Lemley, supra
note x, at 33 (exhaustion doctrine should preempt license term that precludes reverse engineering); id at
35-36 (patent misuse should apply to attempts to prevent reverse engineering in software license);
110
17 U.S.C. §1201(a).
111
Lexmark, Int’l Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., Civil Action No. 02-571-KSF (E.D.
Kentucky) (2003); David Becker, Lexmark Wins Injunction in DMCA Case, CNET NEWS.COM, Feb. 27,
2003, available at: http://news.com.com/2100-1028-990501.html?tag=fd_top (preliminary injunction
granted).
112
See Jonathan B. Cox, Static Control Fights Against Lexmark, NEWS & OBSERVER, MARCH 4,
2003, available at: http://newsobserver.com/business/story/2281215p-2146345c.html (ink cartridge
manufacturer filed antitrust counterclaim against printer manufacturer); Dan L. Burk,
AntiCircumvention Misuse, 48 UCLA L. REV. __ (forthcoming 2003), available at:
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=320961 (calling for anti-circumvention misuse
doctrine comparable to patent and copyright misuse).
113
991 F.2d 511 (9th Cir. 1993).
114
The demand for software maintenance, like frequency of use, is probably correlated with the
value of the hardware to the customer. Price discrimination is achieved by charging more to customers
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claim was based on the temporary copy that was made when Peak
technicians turned on an MAI computer and the operating system was
loaded into RAM.115 An amendment to the Copyright Act partially
overruled this case by adding section 117(c) which allows a software owner
or lessee to authorize a RAM copy for the purpose of hardware
maintenance or repair.116
Patent law facilitates ties by allowing contributory infringement suits
against competing suppliers of a tied product.117 For example, Rohm &
Haas owned a patent on a method for using an unpatented chemical named
propanil as a herbicide.118 The company effectively tied sale of propanil to
a license to practice the method by refusing to license any farmer who
obtained propanil from another source.119 Rohm & Haas sued a competing
manufacturer of propanil for contributory infringement. The paramount
question was whether the tie was justified as a means of controlling
contributory infringement, or instead was a misuse of the patent which
would have made the patent unenforceable. Section 271(c) specifies that a
person is liable for contributory infringement if they sell a component of a
patented machine, or a material for use in practicing a patented process.120
A critical element of a contributory infringement claim is a showing that
the defendant’s product is a non-staple, i.e., not suitable for substantial noninfringing use.121 Propanil was a non-staple since it had no use except to
practice the patented method.122 Ties that serve to deter contributory
infringement fall into a safe harbor created in Section 271(d) which assures
that such a tie is not misuse.123 Applying §271(c) and (d) the Court found
Dawson Chemical’s sale of propanil was contributory patent infringement
————————————————————————————————
who need a lot of maintenance, and presumably they are high frequency and high value customers. See
Meurer, Price Discrimination, supra note 13, at 88.
115
See MAI Systems Corp. v. Peak Computer, Inc., 991 F.2d 511, 517-20 (9th Cir. 1993)
116
17 U.S.C. §117. The new provision does not apply to software maintenance.
117
Patent law once was hostile to such ties but today promotes the use of ties to combat
contributory infringement. The hostility peaked in the 1940s with cases like Mercoid Corp. v. MidContinent Investment Co., 320 U.S. 661 (1944), and Mercoid Corp. v. Minneapolis-Honeywell
Regulator Co., 320 U.S. 680 (1944). Recent cases have been quite tolerant. See Dawson Chemical v.
Rohm & Haas Co., 448 U.S. 176 (1980).
118
See Dawson Chemical v. Rohm & Haas Co., 448 U.S. 176 (1980).
119
See id. at 186.
120
35 U.S.C. §271(c). If there is no underlying infringement, then there can be no contributory
infringement. Also the defendant must have knowledge of patent infringement not just knowledge of
the sort of use that end users engage in.
121
35 U.S.C. §271(c).
122
See Dawson Chemical, 448 U.S. at 185-86.
123
35 U.S.C. §271(d). If the tie is not designed to enforce rights against contributory
infringement, then it is judged by normal misuse standards which mirror antitrust standards applied to
ties.
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and there was no patent misuse.124
The diverse marketing practices discussed in this section are linked by
the notion that they can all be used to implement price discrimination based
on frequency of use.125 Many of the normative issues raised in the context
of type of use restrictions and price discrimination apply here. For example,
the output effect of usage based pricing can be positive or negative. Output
based pricing tends to draw new customers into a market, specifically,
customers who are infrequent users who are attracted by the relatively low
price charged for infrequent use. Consumption tends to fall among current
customers who formerly consumed as much as they wanted, and now face a
positive price for each additional use. 126
An important and difficult policy issue concerns coordination of
antitrust and IP law to channel frequency of use pricing toward socially
advantageous implementation methods.127 Some methods are prohibited by
antitrust and misuse law.128 Sellers committed to usage based pricing will
choose the most profitable of the permissible methods; their choice will
depend on the way IP law affects the cost of various methods. IP
encourages product design ties by protecting interfaces with patents, trade
secret law and anti-circumvention law. It discourages design ties by
———————————————————
124

See Dawson Chemical, 448 U.S. at 221-23.
125
The restraints discussed in this section have many other possible uses. Tying arrangements
promote efficiency in a variety of ways. They serve a quality control function. See HOVENKAMP, ET AL.,
supra note 6 at §21.2a. Information about frequency of use helps a lessor properly maintain leased
equipment. Id. at §21.2e. Usage charges help diffuse something economists call the “adverse selection
problem.” Cite. A potential user who is unsure about the value of a new technology can be reassured by
an arrangement that requires payment only if he actually uses the product. Id. Further, strong IP
protection of design interfaces allows the producer of the tying product to license competing
manufacturers of the tied product and maintain control over the price of the tied product in order to
mitigate pricing externalities facing tied product suppliers. See Douglas G. Lichtman, Property Rights
in Emerging Platform Technologies, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 615, 616-20 (2000).
Tying arrangement also pose risks of anti-competitive harm. The main hazards are foreclosure
and promotion of collusion. See HOVENKAMP ET AL., supra note 6, at §§21.3c, 21.3d. The law
governing product compatibility and reverse engineering should attend closely anti-competitive
hazards. See Pamela Samuelson, Fair Use for Computer Programs and Other Copyrightable Works in
Digital Form: Implications of Sony, Galoob and Sega, 1 J. Intell. Prop. L. 49 (1993). Copyright
protection should be limited so copyright holders cannot expand their copyright software protection to
related markets. Pamela Samuelson & Suzanne Scotchmer, The Law and Economics of Reverse
Engineering, 111 Yale L.J. 1575, 1588-90 (2002) (evaluating the social welfare effect of reverse
engineering in terms of incentive to innovate, incentive for follow-on innovation, price, and wasted
cost).
126
See Meurer Price Discrimination, supra note 13, at 125-26.
127
An interesting question is whether the law should encourage IP owners to choose software
interfaces to implement metering, because it is cheaper than using physical interfaces.
128
Antitrust law regulates contractual tying more closely than technological tying. See
HOVENKAMP, ET AL., supra note 6 at §21.5b2 (noting that most ties cannot be challenged under Section
One of the Sherman Act, or Section Three of the Clayton Act, and they are difficult to invalidate under
Section Two of the Sherman Act).
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treating reverse engineering as lawful under copyright and trade secret
law.129 Patent law encourages ties involving non-staples and copyright law
encourages direct frequency of use pricing by making temporary digital
copies infringing.130
The appropriate scope of the contributory infringement doctrine is
another crucial policy issue facing IP law.131 Liability attaches to
defendants who sell a product or component that is not capable of a
substantial non-infringing use. The scope of the doctrine can be adjusted by
narrow or broad interpretation of the terms capable of and substantial.132
Broader scope encourages usage based pricing, makes enforcement easier,
and increases the value of a patent or copyright. Narrower scope
encourages sale of the defendant’s product, and reduces rent-seeking IP
litigation. The contributory infringement doctrine provides a social benefit
by reducing enforcement costs. A process patent, like the one in Dawson
Chemical, is difficult to enforce when practice of the process is easy to
hide. 133 Patent law eases the enforcement burden for processes that
consume a non-staple input (like propanil) because sales of the input are
difficult to hide and can be targeted for enforcement action by the patent
owner.134 The doctrine needs to be limited though to prevent overrewarding patentees and shifting too much of the cost of enforcement to
third parties.135 An overly broad doctrine also creates the danger that the
———————————————————
129

There is a conflict between the circuits regarding contracts that prohibit reverse engineering.
The Fifth Circuit preempted a term that prohibited reversed engineering under the copyright statute, see
Vault v. Quaid, 847 F.2d 255 (5th Cir. 1988), but the Federal Circuit refused to apply preemption in a
similar setting, see Bowers v. Baystate Technology, 302 F.3d 1344 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
130
See supra text accompanying notes 95-106.
131
See Hodosh v. Block Drug Co., Inc., 833 F.2d 1575 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (defining non-staple in
patent law); Stacey L. Dogan, Is Napster a VCR? The Implications of Sony for Napster and Other
Internet Technologies, 52 HASTINGS L.J. 939, 940 (2001) “[W]e have little idea of what the copyright
staple article of commerce doctrine means. Neither the Supreme Court nor subsequent lower court
decisions have elucidated what kinds of products or services can qualify as staple articles of commerce,
nor have they provided a framework for deciding whether such an article has a ‘substantial noninfringing use.’”
132
See 35 U.S.C. §271(c); Sony Corp. of Amer. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417,
434-42 (1984). The term substantial is not clearly defined, but apparently it is less stringent than
requiring the majority of uses are non-infringing. Id. at 490-92 (J. Blackmun dissenting) Further, the
phrase capable of indicates that future non-infringing uses are sufficient to escape liability.
133
See Dawson Chemical v. Rohm & Haas Co., 448 U.S. 176, 188 (1980); Michael A.
Shimokaji, Inducement and Contributory Infringement Theories to Regulate Pre-Patent Issuance
Activity, 37 IDEA: THE JOURNAL OF LAW AND TECHNOLOGY 571, 586 (1997).
134
Additional enforcement benefits arise because the patent owner can reduce the number of
suits required for effective enforcement and because the smaller profit from suing direct infringers
sometimes makes those suits unprofitable. [Common sense: no authority needed.]
135
See C.R. Bard, Inc., v. Advanced Cardiovascular Systems, 911 F.2d 670, 675 (Fed. Cir. 1990)
(When an item that is sold to the public might have non-infringing as well as infringing uses “the public
interest in access to that article is necessarily implicated.”); Dogan, supra note 110, at 942 (advocating
an approach that focuses on consumer access to markets outside the scope of the copyright); but see
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seller of a staple product could be exploited through an opportunistic patent
or copyright suit.136
IV. REPAIR AND MODIFICATION
It is not unusual in IP protected markets for sellers to make strategic
decisions about the durability of their products. Naturally, they make
product design decisions that affect product durability, but sellers also use
vertical restraints to control the economic life of a product. Specifically,
they can use contract and IP law to restrict or prohibit user repair or
modification — the effect of these restrictions is to stop users from
extending the economic life of their products. These restrictions can be
profitable in three different ways. First, they help the seller control
frequency of use and implement price discrimination. Second, they help the
seller suppress the second-hand market. And third, they help the seller
maintain a monopoly sales price.
The previous section explained that sellers often use the sale of a tied
product to measure the frequency of use of a tying product. Buyers can
thwart this strategy by reusing the tied product. Sellers can respond by
making it difficult to reuse the tied product. Such a struggle apparently is
taking place in the printer market.137 Printer companies tie the sale of ink
cartridges to printers because cartridge sales are a good measure of
frequency of use. Printer companies have discouraged third party cartridge
suppliers by making it difficult to design a compatible cartridge and by
enforcing patent and copyright rights.138 Buyers responded by simply
refilling empty cartridges with ink. Hewlett Packard countered by
designing cartridges to be non-refillable.139 A company named Repeat-OType Stencil purchased HP ink cartridges, modified them so that they could
————————————————————————————————
BOWMAN, supra note 6, at 146-49, 153-54 (approving cases finding that divisibility of the right to
control use implies that tying a staple article of commerce to a patent license is acceptable). When
enforcement costs are shifted from IP owners to third parties they might act as a tax on socially valuable
new technology that incidentally facilitates IP infringement. See Dan L. Burk, Muddy Rules for
Cyberspace, 21 CARDOZO L. REV. 121, 176 (1999) (must be careful not to discourage technological
progress).
136
See Meurer, supra note 25, at 5.
137
See Hewlett-Packard v. Repeat-O-Type Stencil, 123 F.3d 1445 (Fed. Cir. 1997); Becker,
supra note 93 (“Printer makers have employed a variety of technological means in recent years to
undercut the market for recycled toner and ink cartridges, which typically sell for much less than
original items. Most printer makers sell their printers at or near cost, making their profit from sales of
supplies.”).
138
See id. at 1448-50 (patent and trademark infringement claims); Lexmark, Int’l Inc. v. Static
Control Components, Inc., Civil Action No. 02-571-KSF (E.D. Kentucky) (2003).
139
See Hewlett-Packard v. Repeat-O-Type Stencil, 123 F.3d 1445, 1449 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
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be refilled, and sold them to the public. HP sued Repeat-O-Type for patent
infringement. The Federal Circuit ruled against HP and held the
modification was not infringing.140
Sellers also limit reuse of a product outside the tying context. Medical
device makers often limit buyers to a single use of a product even though
the product could be refurbished and reused.141 The most likely rationale is
to discourage the development of a second-hand market.142 Mallinckrodt v.
Medipart143 featured a patented medical device used to deliver mist to the
lungs of patients. The patent owner marked the device: “For Single Use
Only.” The defendant salvaged used devices, sterilized the main parts and
resold them. The court treated the label as a valid contract term and
enforced the restriction despite an objection that the restriction violated the
exhaustion doctrine.144
Even if a patent owner fails to impose a contractual restraint on reuse,
it can still prohibit certain kinds of reuse that are characterized as infringing
reconstruction. In Cotton-Tie Co. v. Simmons145 the patent owner sold
patented metal bands used to tie bales of cotton. When the cotton bales
arrived at the cotton mill the bands were cut. The defendant collected and
recycled the bands. The Court held this was infringing reconstruction.146
When courts want to limit the patent owner’s control over reuse they
characterize a defendant’s actions as repair rather than reconstruction.147
Kendall Co. v. Progressive Medical Tech., Inc.,148 illustrates non-infringing
repair. The patent covered a medical device that creates pressure used to
treat and prevent deep vein thrombosis. The invention comprises a pump,
tube, and pressure sleeve. The pressure sleeve is marked: “For Single Use
Only.” The defendant made and sold replacement sleeves. The combination
of the old tube and pump with the replacement sleeves was not
reconstruction of the invention, rather it was non-infringing repair.149
Sellers restrict repair of some patented devices even when tying and
———————————————————
140

See id. at 1454.
141
See e.g., Karl Storz Endoscopy-America Inc. v. Surgical Technologies Inc. 285 F.3d 848 (9th
Cir. 2002) (reversing summary judgment for defendant because reconstruction of medical device might
constitute trademark infringement).
142
See id. at 852-53. This restriction could also be valuable to the seller as a way to monitor
frequency of use.
143
See id. at 709.
144
976 F.2d 700 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
145
106 U.S. 89 (1882).
146
Id. at 94.
147
Mark D. Janis, A Tale of the Apocryphal Axe: Repair, Reconstruction, and the Implied
License in Intellectual Property Law, 58 MD. L. REV. 423 (1999).
148
85 F.3d 1570 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
149
See id. at 1574-76.
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second-hard markets are not present. Such restrictions may be necessary to
support a high sale price that is predicated on the belief that consumers will
return to purchase a replacement from the patent owner when the device
they currently own reaches an optimal retirement age. Ideally, a seller
should encourage users to properly maintain a device to prolong its life,
and discourage inefficient repairs and modifications. A buyer might
practice inefficient repair because the seller uses its market power to set the
replacement price above the cost of the replacement.150 This theory justifies
certain contractual restrictions on repair and also the practice of
characterizing certain activities as infringing reconstruction even though
that might easily be characterized as repair instead.151
In Sandvik Aktiebolag v. E. J. Co.,152 the defendant placed new tips on
drill bits covered by plaintiff’s drill patent. Even though the drill tip was
not separately patented, the court ruled this was infringing
reconstruction.153 The court distinguished and permitted users to sharpen
the tip when it becomes dull.154 The court emphasized that sharpening a
———————————————————
150

Let me illustrate this result with an example. To keep the story simple, suppose that there are
six years remaining in the term of the patent that protects a durable good, and suppose there is no
discounting of future costs and benefits. The good provides a benefit of 5 for each year of use. It costs 4
to make a new good, and the good lasts for two years if it is not repaired. The user can repair the good
at a cost of 3 and extend its life by one year, so a repaired good lasts a total of three years. In this
setting, repair is inefficient because it costs 3 to get a year of service from a good through repair, but
only 4/2 = 2 to get a year of service from manufacture of a new good. If the user is not allowed to repair
the good, then the patent owner will charge 10 for the good, and a user would make three purchases
over the remaining six years of the patent. The patent owner would earn a profit of 10 - 4 = 6 on each
sale for a total profit of 18 from each user.
If the user is allowed to repair the good, then the seller will earn a smaller total profit, and the
user will engage in inefficient repair. At the previous price of 10, a user would only make two
purchases instead of three over the remaining patent term. The user would repair the good at the end of
the second year by paying the repair cost of 4. By making repairs, the user limits her total costs over the
six years to 2(10) + 2(3) = 26, the cost of two purchases and two repairs. This is smaller than the cost of
three purchases, and it delivers the same benefit. If the patent owner charged a price of 10 it would get a
profit from each user of 12 not 18, because it would make two sales not three. The patent owner
actually maximizes its profit by raising the price to 12. Users make two purchases and perform two
repairs. The patent owner earns a profit of 12 - 4 = 8 on each sale for a total profit of 16 from each user.
If the patent owner wanted to induce users to make three purchases and forego inefficient repair, it
would have to cut the price to 6. But the patent owner would not choose such a low price because it
gives a profit of only 6-4 = 2 on each sale for a total profit of 6 from each user.
151
Compare Aro Mfg. Co. v. Convertible Top Replacement Co., 365 U.S. 336, 345 (1961)
(replacement of fabric in patented roof for convertible car is not infringing), to Sandvik Aktiebolag v.
E.J. Co., 121 F.3d 669 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (replacement of drill tip is infringing).
Reconstruction occurs when a spent article is made new. Relevant factors include: whether some
component has a shorter useful life than the article as a whole, how the article is designed, the existence
of a market to make or service a part, and the nature of the defendant’s actions. See id. at 673.
152
121 F.3d 669 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
153
Id. at 674.
154
Id.
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dull tip is a routine practice, but replacing a tip is difficult and expensive.155
Users only place a new tip on a drill when it is no longer possible to
sharpen the old tip properly. This distinction makes economic sense if the
savings that results from deferring the manufacture of a new drill are
smaller than the cost of replacing a tip and larger than the cost of
sharpening a tip.156
Software publishers often prohibit software modification; this vertical
restraint prevents users from extending the economic life of the software
and may have a similar effect to restraints on the repair of patented
products.157 Some users modify software so they can add new features or
move it to a new platform.158 The seller might prefer the user buy a new
version of the software rather than modify an old version. The adaptation
right in copyright law applies to software modifications and makes them
infringing,159 but the right is significantly constrained by Section 117160 and
the fair use doctrine.161 Despite these limitations on the adaptation right,
contract terms that restrict modification are likely to be enforced.162
Vertical restraints affecting repair and modification help sellers
control the economic life of their products. Policy analysis of these
restraints raises two interesting questions. First, do the restraints promote
efficient repair and modification or instead wasteful obsolescence? And
———————————————————
155

Id. at 673.
This approach could reach similar outcomes to the approach proposed by Janis. He
recommends that the reasonable expectations of the parties should guide the characterization of an
activity as repair or reconstruction. See Mark D. Janis, A Tale of the Apocryphal Axe: Repair,
Reconstruction, and the Implied License in Intellectual Property Law, 58 MD. L. REV. 423, 428, 485
(1999). The approaches coincide if the parties expectations are simply that repair will be undertaken if
and only if it is efficient.
157
See Meurer, Price Discriminination, supra note 13, at 86. Cf CARL SHAPIRO & HAL R.
VARIAN, INFORMATION RULES: A STRATEGIC GUIDE TO THE NETWORK ECONOMY 193 (1999)
(discussing strategy used for software upgrades).
158
See id.
159
See Midway Mfg. Co. v. Artic International, 704 F.2d 1009 (7th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 464
U.S. 923 (1983); Micro Star v. Formgen Inc., 154 F.3d 1107 (9th Cir. 1998).
160
See 17 U.S.C. §117(a) (allows adaptation required as an essential step in use of a computer
program or adaptation for archival purposes); Vault Corp. v. Quaid Software Ltd., 847 F.2d 255, 270
(5th Cir. 1988) (holding an act which allows sellers to prohibit adaptation rights of software conflicts
with the rights of users under § 117 and is federally preempted); Pamela Samuelson, Symposium on
U.S.-E.C. Legal Relations: Comparing U.S. And EC Copyright Protection For Computer Programs:
Are They More Different Than They Seem? 13 J.L. & Com. 279, 284 (1994) (Section 117 allows
modification to run a program on a different machine).
161
See Lewis Galoob Toys v. Nintendo of America, 964 F.2d 965 (9th Cir. 1992), cert. den., 507
U.S. 985 (1993). The defendant Galoob was accused of contributory infringement by making and
selling devices that enable Nintendo videogame users to create unauthorized derivative works. Galoob
manufactured a device called the Game Genie that was used to change features the games. The court
denied that a derivative work existed and in the alternative applied the fair use doctrine. But see Micro
Star v. Formgen, 154 F.3d 1107, 1113 (9th Cir. 1998) (overruling Galoob).
162
See Samuelson, supra note 130, at 284.
156
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second, are the restraints necessary to assure IP owners capture an adequate
reward in durable product markets?
IP owners would argue that restraints on reconstruction encourage
efficient repair, and help support the high profit level required to induce
innovation. The ability to block reuse eases the threat of competition from
the secondary market.163 The ability to control effective product life helps
sellers escape a curse on durable product monopolists that prevents them
from charging a monopoly price. Ronald Coase conjectured, and
microeconomists later confirmed, that durable product monopolists have
trouble sustaining a price above the competitive price, because they have
trouble committing themselves not to price discriminate over time.164 The
prospect that price will fall over time, discourages high valuation
consumers from making an early purchase at a high price, and thus the
seller’s inability to commit to a high price leads to a relatively low initial
price. One solution requires the seller to convert the durable product into a
perishable product.165 Commitment to charge a high price is no longer a
problem because high valuation users are repeatedly in the market along
with all other users. The restraints discussed in this section have the effect
of making products less durable, and they might be motivated by a desire to
escape the Coase conjecture.166
IP users would object that some restraints on repair and modification
are socially harmful. These arguments are plausible in cases in which a
second-hand market would increase output or when inefficient product life
choices are made to overcome the Coase conjecture or support frequency of
use pricing or some other form of price discrimination.167 To make these
objections convincing IP users should also argue that profit and incentive to
innovate would not be harmed too much by constraining repair and
modification restraints.
V. PACKAGES
IP owners sometimes insist that buyers and licensees take a package of
———————————————————
163

See JEAN TIROLE, THE THEORY OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 79-80 (1988) (the size of the
profit to the monopolist depends on how the ease of recycling).
164
See id. at 72-74, 80-87 (1988) (explaining the Coase conjecture).
165
West Publishing has largely shifted from making law books, a durable good, to providing
subscription databases.
166
Cf. John Wiley, Eric Rasmusen, & J. Mark Ramseyer, The Leasing Monopolist, 37 UCLA L.
REV. 693 (1990). This argument can be used to defend the position that mass-marketed software is
licensed not sold. The debate about whether mass-marketed software should be characterized as
licensed or sold see David Nimmer, Elliot Brown, & Gary N. Frischling, The Metamorphosis of
Contract into Expand, 87 CALIF. L. REV. 17 (1999).
167
See Meurer, Price Discrimination, supra, note 13, at 101-02.
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products or licenses. Usually mandatory packages are profitable because
they reduce enforcement or other transaction costs, or because they
implement price discrimination. The convenience of packaging is easy to
see when IP owners hold a large portfolio of patents or copyrights. A radio
patent pool held 570 patents and 200 applications.168 ASCAP and BMI, the
two larges music performance rights organizations each control millions of
music copyrights.169 The role of packaging in price discrimination is a little
more to difficult to see.
An example illustrates how packaging helps a seller achieve price
discrimination.170 Suppose a company owns patents A and B that are of
interest to two potential licensees X and Y. Suppose X would be willing to
pay 2 for a license to A and 4 for a license to B. Suppose Y would be
willing to pay 5 for a license to A and 3 for a license to B. The optimal
price for the package is 6 which yields revenue of 12. If the patent owner
sets separate fees for the licenses the price of A would be 5 and the price of
B would be 3. Firm X would not take a license to A, and revenue would be
5 from patent A plus 6 from patent B for a total of 11. Thus, the package
gives more revenue to the patent owner and increases diffusion of the
technology.171
Unlike the other vertical restraints discussed in this Article, IP law
regulates packaging pretty much the same way that antitrust does.172 The
main tool of IP oversight is the misuse doctrine which follows antitrust
doctrine regarding packaging quite closely. The convenience of packaging
makes courts reluctant to find antitrust liability173 or apply the misuse
doctrine.174 Courts have displayed some hostility toward packaging that
———————————————————
168

See Automatic Radio Manuf. Co. v. Hazeltine Research, 339 U.S. 827 (1950).
See BMI and ASCAP Reject Licensing Legislation, ascap.com, available at:
http://www.ascap.com/press/1998/legislation-100898.html (last visited Feb. 15, 2003).
170
See Stanley M. Besen & Sheila N. Kirby, Private Copying, Appropriability, and Optimal
Copyright Royalties, 32 J.L. & ECON. 255 (1989) (price discrimination by music performance rights
societies); Meurer, Price Discrimination, supra, note 13, at 109-11.
171
It is also possible to construct examples such that packaging increases profit but reduces total
output. Suppose firm Z is added to the market as a potential licensee and it values A at 5/3 and B at 2.
The optimal price for a package is still 6 which yields the same revenue of 12. But if the patent owner is
required to set separate royalty rates, then the optimal rate for A is 5/3 and the optimal rate for B is 2
which yields total revenue of 11. Thus, total revenue (or profit) declines, but output grows because firm
Z takes the licenses when they are priced separately, but not when they are offered as a package.
172
See Meurer, Price Discrimination, supra note 13, at 121, 124 (describing limited
circumstances in which copyright facilitates packaging).
173
See Broadcast Music Inc. v. CBS, Inc., 441 U.S. 1 (1979) (approving BMI’s licensing
practices as a convenient means of marketing and enforcing public performance licenses).
174
See Automatic Radio Manuf. Co. v. Hazeltine Research, 339 U.S. 827 (1950) (no misuse
because the royalty scheme achieved simplicity in accounting and was done for the convenience of the
parties).
169
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implemented price discrimination,175 but that attitude is probably fading.176
Only rare packaging cases where the plaintiff demonstrates a foreclosure or
collusion facilitating effect are likely to violate antitrust laws or the misuse
doctrine.177
VI. EXIT
IP regulation of exit restraints is broader than antitrust regulation, but
like packaging restraints, the IP approach to exit restraints approximates the
antitrust approach.178 Exit restraints arise when contracting parties commit
to a long-term relationship and commit not to deal with others. Such
commitments can be an efficient way to encourage parties to invest in a
relationship, but they occasionally pose a danger to competition.179 That
danger is elevated when one of the parties owns patents or copyrights that
might lead to market power.180 Patent law regulates certain restraints that
impede a licensee’s ability to exit his relationship with a patent owner
through the misuse and preemption doctrines.181 Copyright law has enacted
compulsory licenses to moderate the danger that exclusive licenses can be
used to create market power in downstream markets.
Patent law condemns as misuse contract terms that extend the patent
beyond its expiration date.182 This policy originates in Brulotte v. Thys Co.,
a case in which the patentee sold a hop picking machine to farmers under a
contract which required royalty payments after the patents covering the
machine had expired.183 Misuse also requires that when a patent owner
licenses a package of IP rights containing U.S. patents the royalty rate must
———————————————————
175

See U. S. v. Loews Inc., 371 U.S. 38 (1962); Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, 395
U.S. 100 (1969); Broadcast Music Inc. v. CBS, Inc., 441 U.S. 1 (1979) Justice Stevens dissenting
(harmful price discrimination implemented via the blanket license).
176
See HOVENKAMP ET AL., supra note 6, at §22.6 (disapproving antitrust oversight of packaging
designed to price discriminate).
177
See HOVENKAMP ET AL., supra note 6, at §22; Barry J. Nalebuff, Bundling, available at:
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=185193 (packaging may cause exclusion when
buyers have positively correlated valuations); Yannis Bakos & Erik Brynjolfsson, Bundling and
Competition on the Internet, NYU Working Paper, available at: www.stern.nyu.edu/~bakos (April
1999) (bundling may deter entry into markets for digital content).
178
The goals pursued in Brulotte and Lear, discussed in the next two paragraphs, match antitrust
goals, but derive from patent law rather than antitrust. See HOVENKAMP ET AL., supra note 6, at §23.2c.
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See, U.S. v. American Can Co., 230 F. 859, 874 (D. Md. 1916), appeal dismissed, 256 U.S.
706 (1921) (canning company secured contracts for the entire output of canning machine manufacturers
and also assignment or exclusive license of their patents).
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See id.
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See generally, Michael J. Meurer, An Economic Analysis of Royalty Terms in Patent Licenses,
67 MINN. L. REV. 1198 (1983).
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See HOVENKAMP ET AL., supra note 6, at §3.3b3.
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379 U.S. 29 (1964).

March 6, 2003

VERTICAL RESTRAINTS AND IP LAW

30

be reduced as patents in the package expire.184
Patent law preempts contract terms that purport to require royalties on
an invalid patent. In Lear, Inc. v. Adkins,185 Lear licensed a patented
gyroscope from Adkins. Lear stopped making royalty payments because it
believed the patent was invalid, and Adkins brought suit. The Supreme
Court overturned a contract doctrine that estopped licensees from
challenging the validity of a patent because patent law preempted the
contract doctrine. Later cases extended preemption to various contract
terms that discourage validity challenges.186
In copyright protected markets important policy concerns arise with
exit restraints that are directed upstream at creators. An interesting example
comes from the player piano industry. In early twentieth century America
piano rolls were a major source of revenue for the music industry.187 A firm
named the Aeolian Company dominated the market for piano rolls and for
player pianos.188 In the first decade of the century, Aeolian signed deals
with several music publishers that granted Aeolian the exclusive right to
make piano rolls using the songs in their catalogues.189 Interestingly, these
———————————————————
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Pitney Bowes, Inc. v. Mestre, 701 F.2d 1365 (1983), cert. den. 464 U.S. 893 (198x) (royalty
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Meehan v. PPG Industr., Inc., 802 F.2d 881 (7th Cir. 1986) (royalty payments on U.S. sales under
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expires). Cf. Boggild v. Kenner Prods., 776 F.2d 1315 (6th Cir. 1985), cert. den. 477 U.S. 908 (198x)
(misuse in assignment agreement that required payments for 25 years regardless of whether patents
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395 U.S. 653 (1969).
186
See Timely Products, Inc. v. Costanzo, 465 F. Supp. 91, 99 (D. Conn. 1979); Business Forms
Finishing Service, Inc. v. Carson, 452 F.2d 70, 75 (7th Cir. 1971); Massillion—Cleveland—Akron Sign
Co. v. Golden State Advertising, 444 F.2d 425, 427 (9th Cir. 1971). Just before the creation of the
Federal Circuit, the Supreme Court signaled a retreat from these cases in Aronson v. Quick Point Pencil
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contract despite the tension with Brulotte and Lear. See id. at 264-66. Brulotte and Lear are not popular
with the Federal Circuit. See Universal Gym Equipment, Inc. v. ERWA Exercise Equipment, Ltd., 827
F.2d 1542, 1550 (Fed. Cir. 1987); Hemstreet v. Spiegel, Inc., 851 F.2d 348, 350-51 (Fed. Cir. 1988);
Foster v. Hallco Mfg. Co., 947 F.2d 469, 476-77 (Fed. Cir. 1991); Studiengesellschaft Kohle m.b.H. v.
Shell Oil Co., 112 F.3d 1561, 1567-68 (Fed. Cir. 1997); Flex-Foot, Inc. v. CRP, Inc., 238 F.3d 1362,
1368-70 (Fed. Cir. 2001). As a result, careful contract drafting usually avoids the threat of misuse or
preemption.
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Contracting into Liability Rules: Intellectual Property Rights and Collective Rights Organizations, 84
CALIF. L. REV. 1293 (1996) (questioning whether Aeolian Company dominated the player piano
industry around the time of the 1909 copyright revisions).
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See Theresa M. Bevilacqua, Note: Time To Say Good-Bye To Madonna's American Pie: Why
Mechanical Compulsory Licensing Should Be Put To Rest, 19 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 285, 290
(2001). Furthermore, the company “made every effort to perfect and enhance their invention, and
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contracts were negotiated when the player piano was a relatively new
technology, and there was uncertainty whether piano roll makers needed
copyright permission. The Aeolian contracts were contingent on the courts
or Congress establishing that piano rolls were subject to music composition
copyrights. The Supreme Court decided piano rolls were not infringing
copies because they were not fixed within the meaning of the 1870
Copyright Act.190 Composers and music publishers lobbied Congress to
make piano rolls subject to copyright law, and partially succeeded;
Congress extended copyright law to cover mechanical reproductions of
music.191 Player piano and piano roll competitors of Aeolian also lobbied
Congress seeking relief from the market power Aeolian would get from its
exclusive contracts. Congress responded by combining the mechanical
reproduction right with a compulsory license provision that effectively
nullified the exclusionary term in the Aeolian contracts.192
IP regulation of exit restraints presents the same basic policy concerns
presented by antitrust regulation.193 Certain exit restraints are used to deter
entry or raise the costs of competing with the firm that imposes the
restraints, but most exit restraints advance some efficiency goal.194 The
difficult question is how to deter harmful restraints without discouraging
efficient restraints. For example, restraints like those in Brulotte might have
an anti-competitive effect similar to certain long-term requirements
contracts,195 or they might simply implement a convenient payment method
————————————————————————————————
throughout this period they kept the most famous pianists under contract.” See Nimbus Records,
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for liquidity constrained users.196 Similarly, restrictions on challenges to the
validity of a patent might preserve an entry barrier based on an invalid
patent, but they also promote efficient settlement of litigation.197 The
compulsory licensing approach used in copyright is quite difficult to
manage effectively because of the twin problems of deciding when a
compulsory license is appropriate, and fixing an appropriate royalty rate.198
CONCLUSION
IP law is much more active than antitrust law in regulating vertical
restraints in IP protected markets.199 Vertical restraints are implemented
through contract, IP enforcement, and product design. Antitrust regulates
vertical restraints by condemning contract terms that are judged anticompetitive. IP law often takes a similar approach, condemning certain
contract terms through application of the misuse and preemption doctrines.
But IP law has additional means of influencing contract based restrictions.
It encourages vertical restrictions by bolstering contract remedies with IP
remedies when a user violates a use restriction, and it provides default
terms to fill incomplete contracts. Furthermore, IP facilitates vertical
restraints by granting IP rights against strangers who might interfere with
the restraints by playing the role of arbitrageur or materially assisting an act
of infringement. IP law inevitably must be more active than antitrust in
regulating vertical restraints — the law must specify rules about what kinds
———————————————————
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of uses are infringing.
Product design choices implement vertical restraints through
technological ties. Antitrust only weakly regulates product design
decisions. Courts are reluctant to recognize tying claims based on product
design choices because they fear they will discourage socially valuable
innovation. In contrast, IP law actively regulates technological ties, it
encourages ties by protecting product interfaces through patent, trade
secret, and anti-circumvention law, and it discourages ties by promoting
reverse engineering intended to discover product compatibility
requirements. Furthermore, patent and copyright promote price
discrimination by restricting product modifications that aid arbitrage
against price discrimination.
Reviewing six types of vertical restraints, it appears that IP law offers
more extensive regulation of every type except perhaps packaging and exit.
Regulation of packaging through patent misuse basically mimics antitrust
regulation of packaging.200 Patent law oversight of exit restraints comprises
the rules from Brulotte against post-expiration royalties and from Lear
against terms that prevent patent challenges. Neither patent nor antitrust
courts are likely to expand these rules; courts are disposed to believe exit
restraints enhance efficiency and are unlikely to condemn other exit
restraints absent a strong showing of harm to competition.201
IP law regulates the other four types of restraints more extensively
than antitrust because: the rent-seeking costs of opportunistic and anticompetitive litigation are smaller; it uses regulatory instruments other than
simple prohibitions; and it shows greater concern about the welfare effect
of end use restrictions. IP doctrines that discourage vertical restraints
generally cause smaller rent-seeking problems than antitrust doctrines with
a similar effect. IP rules that provide background entitlements are relatively
clear compared to antitrust rules which require uncertain rule of reason
analysis. Furthermore, IP prohibitions that are implemented through
preemption or misuse do not give rise to treble damages, and can only be
used defensively. In contrast, broad antitrust regulation of vertical restraints
creates a threat of opportunistic suits because of uncertainty, the lure of
treble damages, and the possibility of initiating a suit against a vulnerable
———————————————————
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Copyright law facilitates packaging to a small degree by impeding unbundling of a package.
See Meurer, Price Discrimination, supra note 13, at 125.
201
Recent antitrust “cases suggest a skepticism toward claims of forced exclusive dealing,
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market.” See HOVENKAMP, supra note 58, at §7.3d. The Federal Circuit appears hostile to Brulotte and
Lear and reads them narrowly. See Dreyfuss, supra note 199, at 693-707.
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defendant.202 The greater reach and wider policy concerns of IP law are
reflected in doctrines that affect price discrimination, product durability,
and sharing. Many IP doctrines promote or discourage price discrimination
by tolerating or discouraging arbitrage. Certain IP doctrines regulate repair
and modification and affect the profit that can be earned by IP owners who
are durable product monopolists. Finally, various copyright doctrines
encourage or discourage users from forming coalitions that can bargain
more effectively with copyright owners.

———————————————————
202
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